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Relative Prices and Substitution Across Wage, Welfare, and Disability Income 
 
 
Abstract:  In this paper I exploit the fact that the social and economic reforms over the past two 
decades differentially affected the opportunity costs of non-participation in work, welfare, and 
disability programs for single mothers across different birth-year and education cohorts. This 
cohort variation in after-tax wages and transfer benefits is used to identify own- and cross-price 
elasticities of demand for and substitution across wage, welfare, and disability income over 1979 
to 2001 in the Current Population Survey.  To estimate these key parameters I model household 
preferences with a conditional Almost Ideal Demand System that admits corner solutions, 
nonseparability, endogenous wages and incomes, and latent heterogeneity via cohort and state 
fixed effects. I match individual and family-level data in the CPS both with family-specific 
federal, state, and payroll tax rates, and with state-specific and time-varying benefit levels and 
effective tax rates in the AFDC and SSI programs.  Using a two-limit Tobit instrumental 
variables estimator I find strong evidence of sizable own and cross-programmatic substitution 
effects.  For example, the estimated elasticities imply that between 1979 and 1999 the increase in 
the generosity of SSI relative to AFDC accounts for about 40 percent of the average growth in 
SSI, while the increase in real wages accounts for about one-half of the average decline in AFDC 
shares over the past two decades. Simulations suggest that changes in relative after-tax wages 
and transfer-program benefits over the past two decades lead to a substantial “pull” out of cash 
welfare and into expanded reliance on employment and disability as a means of financial support 
among single mothers. 
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Epochal changes in the U.S. economic and social policy landscapes over the past two decades 
have altered significantly the economic rewards to work, to welfare participation, and to 
participation in disability programs.  These changes affected all segments of the low-income 
population, but were especially pronounced among single female-headed families with children.  
A result of this changing landscape was a massive shift in the composition of the safety net of 
single mothers away from cash welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) and 
toward labor-market based income and credits (the Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC) and 
disability income (Supplemental Security Income, SSI).  In 1979 expenditure levels on AFDC 
totaled $25 billion in real 1999 dollars, $16 billion for SSI, and $4.7 billion for the EITC; by 
1999 $13.5 billion was spent on AFDC, $29 billion on SSI, and $32 billion on the EITC.  At the 
peak of the 1970s expansion, around 40 percent of the poverty gap—that is, the aggregate 
distance between pre-tax and pre-transfer family income and the family-size adjusted poverty 
threshold—was filled by AFDC, but only 3 percent was filled by SSI and 0.30 percent by the 
EITC (Ziliak 2003).  By the peak of the 1990s expansion, AFDC filled only 10 percent of the 
gap, whereas SSI and the EITC filled nearly 9 and 7 percent, respectively. While much attention 
has been placed on factors that “pushed” women off of welfare such as the 1996 welfare reform, 
there were also significant “pull” factors onto disability and into the labor force both from 
increased relative generosity of SSI benefits and from before- and after-tax real wage growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the role of relative price changes in explaining 
substitution across wage, welfare, and disability income over the past two decades.1  
Several explanations have been proffered in recent years to help understand the 
fundamental economic developments affecting low-income American’s decisions to work and/or 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper the term “prices” will be used to refer to the opportunity costs of leisure (wage), of non-
participation in AFDC (AFDC benefit), and of non-participation in SSI (SSI benefit). Moffitt (1981) uses a similar 
terminology. 
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participate in income maintenance programs.  One strand of research emphasizes structural 
changes in the macroeconomy, including shocks to resource markets such as coal (Black, Daniel, 
and Sanders 2002), rising wage inequality (Autor and Duggan 2003), and/or productivity-
induced economic growth (Gundersen and Ziliak 2004; Katz and Krueger 1999; Krueger and 
Solow 2001).  Another strand focuses on tax reform and/or welfare reform, notably expansions 
in the EITC in 1986, 1990, and 1993 and passage of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act (Blank 2002; 
Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Schmidt and Sevak 2004).  
While still yet a third area emphasizes judicial and legislative changes that relaxed disability 
program eligibility criteria (Bound and Burkhauser 1999; Garrett and Glied 2000; Kubik 1999; 
Stapleton, et al. 2001).  Collectively this research has shed important light on various dimensions 
of economic behavior among low-income Americans.  However, the research has at times been 
conducted on a program-by-program basis without regard to interaction effects with other 
programs, and/or without a formal labor market. In addition, the research is frequently executed 
using aggregate county or state-level data, rather than individual-level data, and models are 
typically reduced-form specifications. In short, research emphasizing the role of relative wage 
and transfer-program benefit movements in inducing substitution across various work and 
transfer-program states over time in the context of a behavioral model is lacking.2,3  
Understanding the role of relative price changes in accounting for the shifting 
composition of household budgets is important both for models of the family and for public-
                                                 
2  As part of the 1996 welfare reform the AFDC program was abolished and replaced by a new program, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  For convenience I refer to cash welfare as AFDC throughout this paper.  In 
addition, disability income refers to the SSI program for the purposes of this paper. 
3  This paper is similar in spirit to Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), who used a ‘difference-in-differences’ estimator to 
estimate the effects of changes in after-tax wages and AFDC benefits (along with some other policy variables) on 
the probability of single-mother’s employment from 1984 to 1996. The analysis here differs in many aspects from 
Meyer and Rosenbaum including the focus on both extensive and intensive margins of not just work but also welfare 
and disability, the use of a more structural framework, a different identification and estimation scheme, and the use 
of a longer time series.  
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policy analysis.  For example, to understand the effect of a cut in AFDC benefits, or an increase 
in the EITC, it is critical to know whether labor-force and transfer-program participation and 
quantity decisions are sensitive to changes in wages and program benefits, and if sensitive, to 
quantify the own and cross-price elasticities. While there is considerable evidence on the effect 
of own wages on female labor supply choices (Mroz 1987), we know much less about how the 
earnings of women changes in response to outside options such as the generosity of welfare or 
disability benefits (especially in the context of a structural model), and about how welfare or 
disability program usage of women changes over time in response to other transfer-program 
parameters and labor-market opportunities.4  Research on the latter is crucial to a more complete 
understanding of the recent changes in welfare and work, and ultimately can shed light on issues 
of optimal program design.  
In this paper I exploit the fact that the social and economic reforms over the past two 
decades differentially affected the opportunity costs of non-participation in work, welfare, and 
disability programs for single mothers across different birth-year and education cohorts. This 
cohort variation in after-tax wages and transfer benefits is used to identify own- and cross-price 
elasticities of demand for and substitution across wage, welfare, and disability income over 1979 
to 2001 in the Current Population Survey.   
I begin by developing a static model akin to Moffitt (1983) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) 
where the family head derives utility from work and from participation in two transfer programs: 
cash welfare (AFDC) and disability (SSI), subject to a budget constraint that is nonlinear due to 
the tax treatment of wages and transfers.  Preferences for work, welfare, and disability are 
                                                 
4 Moffitt (1983), Hoynes (1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1998) are important exceptions in the literature on the joint 
choice of work and welfare participation, but each focuses on a single cross-section of data and do not address the 
more recent changes. See Moffitt (1992) for a review of the literature.  There has also been important contributions 
in the literature on the effect of labor-market opportunities on welfare-spell durations, e.g. Blank and Ruggles (1996) 
and Hoynes (2000). 
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conditioned on other income sources (e.g. other transfers and private nonlabor income), 
demographics, macroeconomic and policy factors, and the fact that participation in transfer 
programs may impose a utility “cost” in the form of stigma and/or hassle effects.  I use the 
flexible functional form for indirect preferences that generates a conditional Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) of income shares.  This functional form is the standard bearer in much 
of the consumption literature both because of the flexibility in price and income responses, and 
the fact that it provides a ready means to conduct welfare analysis.  Wages are subject to direct 
taxation from federal, state, and payroll taxes, as well as implicit taxation from the EITC, AFDC, 
and SSI programs. To maintain tractability across twenty-three years of data and fifty-one 
separate state tax and welfare programs, I construct effective marginal tax rates using the 
TAXSIM program from NBER as well as quality control data from the AFDC and SSI programs 
(Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf 1985; McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith 1999).   
Because many families do not receive income from disability, welfare, and/or work, or 
may be solely dependent on one of these sources, the well-known econometric problem of corner 
solutions must be confronted.  In addition, income derived from work, AFDC, and SSI may not 
be separable from other income sources, such as food stamps, the EITC, and other non-labor 
income.  Furthermore, the after-tax wage, after-tax transfer benefits, and income variables are 
likely endogenous in the share equations.  To simultaneously address nonparticipation (i.e. share 
= 0), dependence (i.e. share = 1), nonseparability, and endogeneity I adopt an instrumental 
variables two-limit Tobit-type estimator for the unrestricted system of conditional income-share 
equations (Browning and Meghir 1991; Smith and Blundell 1986).  Identification is achieved by 
assuming that after-tax real wages and transfer benefits, conditional on the cohort group and time 
effects, grow differentially across groups over and above any changes in sample composition in 
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the labor force, welfare programs, or disability programs (Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998). 
This framework provides consistent estimates of preference parameters and readily permits 
calculation of own and cross-price elasticities at both the extensive and the intensive margins, 
calculation of elasticities of substitution, tests of cross-equation restrictions with an auxiliary 
minimum-distance estimator, and welfare costs of alternative transfer-program policies.   
I find strong evidence of sizable own and cross-programmatic substitution effects, both at 
the extensive and intensive margins.  Among single female heads of families the elasticity of 
ever participating in AFDC with respect to the after-tax AFDC benefit is +0.6, it is –0.7 with 
respect to the after-tax SSI benefit, and –1.0 with respect to the after-tax real wage. These 
elasticities provide insight into the role of relative prices in accounting for changes in work, 
welfare, and disability.  For example, between 1979 and 1999 the increase in the generosity of 
SSI relative to AFDC accounts for about 40 percent of the average growth in SSI, while the 
increase in real wages accounts for about one-half of the average decline in AFDC shares over 
the past two decades. Welfare simulations imply that relative price changes across work, welfare, 
and disability over the past two decades lead to a substantial “pull” off of dependence on cash 
welfare and into expanded reliance on employment and disability as a means of financial support 
for single mothers. 
II. Trends in Work, Welfare, and Disability 
Over the past two decades the U.S. economy experienced both the deepest recession and 
the most protracted expansion in post-war history.  Except for a modest tapering off in the mid-
1990s, wage inequality rose unabated during this period (Katz and Autor 1999), but so too did 
labor productivity, especially during the 1990s, that drove down core inflation and 
unemployment rates and led to significant real wage gains across the wage distribution (Katz and 
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Krueger 1999).  Concomitant with these economic developments were major social policy 
reforms and legal rulings that affected cash welfare (AFDC), disability (SSI), and employment.5  
I briefly describe the key programs and reforms in the context of time-series trends in 
participation rates. 
AFDC, which was established by the Fair Labor Standards Act in the 1930s, was the 
primary cash welfare program for low-income families with dependent children under age 18. 
For most of its history over 90 percent of the AFDC caseload was comprised of single mothers 
with children, with the remaining fraction consisting of two-parent cases and so-called child-only 
cases whereby only the child in the family receives the benefit. To qualify the family had to pass 
a sequence of income and liquid asset tests, and the benefit, which was reduced by the presence 
of most forms of earned and unearned income, varied widely both across states and family size.  
Beginning in 1981 the statutory benefit reduction rate was set at 100 percent, though the 
effective tax rates were significantly lower because of state variation in the level and types of 
exemptions (Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf 1985; McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith 1999).  Funding 
for the program was via the federal government with a matching grant supplied by the states, 
with the state match rate set at the same level as required for the state’s Medicaid insurance 
program.   
States began experimenting with their welfare programs in the early-1990s via waivers 
from federal regulations granted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. These 
waivers included time limits on benefit receipt, work requirements, and work incentives such as 
higher earnings disregards and liquid-asset limits. The waivers were codified into federal 
legislation with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
                                                 
5 Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) offer a nice timeline of the passage of major social and tax policy legislation in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
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Act (PRWORA) in 1996.  This eliminated the AFDC program and replaced it with a state block 
grant program known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Under PRWORA, 
cash assistance is no longer an entitlement and aid is subject to a federal lifetime limit of 60 
months (or shorter based on state discretion).  
Figure 1 depicts the time series of AFDC participation rates over the period 1979 to 2001 
among single mothers who are between the ages of 18 and 60 and who have related children 
under age 18 present in the family.6  The figure depicts the trends separately for three education 
groups, less than high school, high school graduates, and those with some post-secondary 
education.  Through most of the 1980s the fraction of the population on AFDC in each group 
held relatively constant, though the levels clearly varied greatly across education groups.  This 
was followed by an upsurge in participation the early 1990s, especially among single mothers 
with high school or more, only to plummet downward for all education groups in the mid and 
late 1990s.  Research to date on the changes in the AFDC program have tended to focus 
primarily on macroeconomic factors, such as state unemployment rates and employment growth 
rates, and policy reforms such as welfare reform and the EITC expansions.  The consensus in the 
literature is that the macroeconomy was the most important factor behind the changes, but there 
is swift debate about the aggregate importance of welfare reform (Blank 2002; Ziliak et al. 
2000).  Comparatively little attention has been paid, however, to the role of relative price 
changes, i.e. AFDC benefits relative to the market wage and relative to SSI benefits, as a source 
of the caseload changes. 
[Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
6 The data, which is described in detail below, come from the Current Population Survey.  In Figure 1 AFDC and 
SSI refer to family-level participation rates, implying that the head may or may not be part of the grant.  It is not 
possible to separate parent from child welfare receipt in the CPS.  The employment rate is based on the family head.  
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The SSI program, which was established in 1972, provides cash assistance to the needy 
aged, the blind, and the disabled.  While identifying potential recipients based on age and vision 
is readily assessed, verifying disabilities is difficult and fraught with controversy.  As described 
in Daly and Burkhauser (2003) there is a three-step process in identifying disabilities: (i) a 
physical or mental malfunction that (ii) leads to an impairment which in turn (iii) generates an 
inability to perform socially expected functions, notably work for adults and schooling for 
children.  Challenges notwithstanding the bulk of the SSI caseload are disabled recipients.  On 
top of the programmatic criteria of being aged, blind, or disabled, to qualify for SSI the family 
must meet both income and liquid asset tests.  In contrast to AFDC and its successor TANF, the 
SSI program has substantially more federal oversight.  The grant and eligibility criteria are set at 
the federal level, as are the statutory benefit reduction rates on earned and unearned incomes.  
Importantly for the analysis in this paper, about half of the states supplement the federal grant for 
individuals living independently, which provides much needed cross-state variation in gross 
benefits for use in identification.   
Figure 1 shows the time series SSI participation rates for the same sample of single 
mothers as used in the AFDC series.  Across all education groups SSI participation was stable in 
the 1980s; however, enrollment increased substantially after 1990, especially among low-
educated single mothers.  Previous research by Kubik (1999) and Garrett and Glied (2000) points 
to a 1990 Supreme Court decision, known as the Zebley decision, for much of the post-1990 
growth in SSI.  As noted previously, an individual is deemed disabled for purposes of SSI 
eligibility if the disability limits or prohibits participation in gainful activity.  For adults the 
gainful activity is generally market work.  Prior to 1990 the Social Security Administration 
maintained a formal list of disabilities recognized as limiting work, but also considered “off-list” 
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disabilities.  However, there was no such “off-list” for children, whose gainful activity was 
schooling.  This had the effect of making SSI eligibility for children more stringent than for 
adults.  The Court ruled in the Zebley decision that the differential treatment of children was 
unconstitutional, and as a consequence Congress redesigned the SSI program to make child 
eligibility no more stringent than adult eligibility.  In the first four years after Zebley the number 
of children receiving SSI increased three-fold (Kubik 1999), but given the continued growth into 
the late 1990s there seems to be other factors at work beyond the Zebley decision. 
Compared to the AFDC program research on the SSI program is scare, and research on 
own and cross-price effects on SSI participation is even less common.  Kubik (1999) is a notable 
exception in his analysis of children on SSI.7  In his child participation model he examined the 
economic incentives facing families on AFDC of moving a child onto SSI by specifying a 
variable he called the net SSI benefit, defined as the gain in family income by moving a child 
from AFDC onto SSI.  When removing a child from the AFDC program the AFDC grant amount 
falls, but the loss in AFDC income is more than offset by the gain in total family income from 
the SSI grant. He used this cross-differential to help identify the growth in the child SSI caseload 
after the Zebley decision. An alternative approach suggested by Kubik, and the one followed 
here, is to use state-specific supplements to the federal SSI grant along with the state-specific 
AFDC grant as separate variables.  As described in the data section the relative variation in these 
series over two decades is substantial, and this cross-section and time-series variation is 
significantly enhanced by the inclusion of effective tax rates that are used in constructing after-
tax AFDC and SSI benefits. 
                                                 
7  Schmidt and Sevak (2004) examine the effect of welfare reform on SSI participation.  Their model differs from 
the current paper in that they rely on a reduced-form specification and do not model a formal labor market. 
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Coincident with the changes in the AFDC and SSI program in the 1990s were substantial 
increases in labor force participation among single mothers.  Figure 1 highlights that the time 
series of employment rates is nearly a mirror image of the trends in AFDC and parallel with the 
growth in SSI.  The research to date attempting to explain the growth in labor-force participation 
among single women with children has emphasized welfare reform and/or EITC expansions 
(Blank 2002; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).  However, additional structural economic models of 
own wages and of cross-program effects on labor-market outcomes are needed for a more 
complete understanding of the changing economic conditions of single mothers.8     
III. An Economic Model of Income Shares 
In this section I develop a standard economic model of labor supply and transfer-program 
participation akin to that proposed by Moffitt (1983) and Keane and Moffitt (1998).  Important 
for the ensuing model are the programmatic interactions among AFDC, SSI, and work. First, it is 
not possible for a given individual to receive both AFDC and SSI income, but families may 
receive both.  Second, aside from the automatic family-size induced reduction in the AFDC 
grant, the AFDC benefit is not reduced by the presence of SSI in the family, and likewise, the 
SSI benefit is not reduced by the presence of AFDC income in the family (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2004; Social Security Administration 2004).  Third, benefits from both AFDC 
and SSI are taxed by the presence of labor-market earnings.  The implication for modeling 
purposes then is that the before-tax state-specific maximum AFDC and SSI benefits can be 
treated as exogenous in models of AFDC, SSI, and work, but before and after-tax wages must be 
treated as endogenous, as must after-tax AFDC and SSI benefits.   
                                                 
8 Kubik (1999) provides a limited analysis of the effects of the AFDC and SSI benefit generosity on labor supply of 
women.  However, his analysis stops in 1994, prior to the big shift in employment, and does not include the 
women’s own wage rate. The distinctions between his model and that of this paper will be highlighted in the next 
section. 
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Specifically, the family head is assumed in each period t to have direct preferences over 
hours of market work, ht, income, Mt, and participation in the cash welfare program AFDC (Ict 
=1 if participate in AFDC; 0 otherwise) and participation in the disability program SSI (Idt = 1 if 
participate in SSI; 0 otherwise). For the moment consider a preference structure where income is 
an implicit function of AFDC and SSI participation, and where transfer program participation 
generates a utility cost, possibly due to stigma or hassle effects. The utility function is 
(1)  ( , ( , ); ) ,t t t ct dt t c ct d dtU h M I I z I Iξ ξ− −   
where , ,jt j c dξ = , are the marginal disutilities of participating in AFDC and SSI, and the zt are a 
set of conditioning goods such as demographics. 
The current-period budget constraint facing the single mother is  
(2)  ( ),t t t t ct ct dt dt t tM W h N I G I G T Y= + + + −  
where Wt is the before-tax hourly wage rate, Nt is nonlabor income aside from AFDC or SSI, Gct 
is the maximum AFDC benefit guarantee, Gdt is the maximum SSI benefit guarantee, Yt is 
taxable income, and Tt(Yt) is tax payments.  The tax payment function emanates both from direct 
taxation of wages and nonlabor income from federal (FED), state, and Social Security payroll 
(SS) tax systems, as well as implicit taxation from participation in the EITC, AFDC, and SSI 
programs.  The tax function is 
(3)  
( ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ),
FED FED SS SS STATE STATE
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
EITC EITC c c d d
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
T Y T W h N E T W h E T W h N E
T W h N E T W h N E T W h N E
= + + +
+ +  
where each component is a function of both wage and nonlabor income (except for the payroll 
tax) and each tax schedule consists of different deductions and exemptions (E).  Defining 
( )t t tT Yτ ′≡  as the marginal tax rate, the resulting after-tax “prices” of work, welfare, and 
disability are, respectively 
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(4)  
,1 ,1
,1 ,2
,1 ,2
(1 ),
,
,
FED SS STATE EITC c d
wt t t t t t t ct t dt
c c
ct ct t t t t t
d d
dt dt t t t t t
p W I I
p G W h N
p G W h N
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ
τ τ
= − − − − − −
= − −
= − −
 
where ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2, , ,c c d dt t t tτ τ τ τ  reflect the fact that the AFDC and SSI programs assess different tax 
rates to labor and nonlabor income. Note that the worker only faces these additional marginal 
rates on their wages if they participate in the program(s), and that the prices of welfare and 
disability are zero if ,1 ,2 0, ,j jjt t t t t tG W h N j c dτ τ− − ≤ = .9  The net prices in equation (4) represent 
the opportunity cost of leisure and non-participation in AFDC and SSI. 
Because the choice of Ict and Idt depends on whether utility is higher when participating in 
one or both programs versus not participating, and since the ensuing focus is on estimating own 
and cross-price effects on budget shares, it is common to turn to the indirect utility function, 
( , , , ( , ); )t t wt ct dt t ct dt t ct ct dt dtV V p p p M I I z I Iξ ξ= − − − − − , where the negative sign in front of the 
prices is needed for indirect utility to have the typical property of non-increasing in prices, i.e., 
higher wages and transfer benefits make consumers better off, contrary to typical goods prices 
that make the consumer worse off.   
Before proceeding it is important to note that aside from work, welfare, and disability the 
single mother has access to a variety of other transfer programs such as the Food Stamp 
Program, housing assistance, the Social Security Disability Income Program, among others.  
Decisions to participate in these programs may not be strongly separable from the focal choice 
variables of work, AFDC, and SSI in equations (1)–(4).  Browning and Meghir (1991), in a 
model of consumption demand, offer a transparent solution to the problem that consumption 
                                                 
9 For simplicity it is assumed that take-up rates in the EITC program are 100 percent.  Using data from 1990, Scholz 
(1994) estimated that EITC participation rates approached 85 percent.  Given the significantly increased generosity 
in the EITC in the 1990s, coupled with major outreach efforts on the part of the IRS, the assumption of complete 
take up does not seem unreasonable.   
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decisions may be nonseparable from labor supply choices by conditioning the demand system on 
labor supply and treating the latter as endogenous in estimation.  This results in a conditional 
demand system that yields most of the parameters relevant for within-period consumer 
preferences.  I follow a similar strategy here by breaking up income, Mt, into the “income from 
programs of interest,” i.e. work, welfare, and disability, denoted throughout as “WWD income” 
and defined as ( )t t t ct ct dt dt t tM W h I G I G T Y= + + − , and “other income” Nt that becomes part of the 
conditioning set, zt.10  As described below, other income will be treated as endogenous in 
estimation.11   
Solving the model in its present form is very complicated because of the highly nonlinear 
budget set and multiplicity of choices across possible hours of work and participation decisions 
in either or both AFDC and SSI.  Keane and Moffitt (1998) tackle their problem in a fully 
structural framework, but to maintain tractability they limit the hours choice to one of three 
outcomes: no work, part-time work, and full-time work, and then utilize a simulated method of 
moments estimator.  A similar approach could be followed here.  However, because my 
objective is to identify the effects of price changes over time the method of Keane and Moffitt is 
not tractable in the face of twenty-three years of data across fifty-one separate state tax and 
welfare programs.  Instead, I adopt a more transparent approach through a number of simplifying 
assumptions, which results in a quasi-structural framework.  
First, instead of solving simultaneously the budget segment location along with the hours 
and transfer-program participation decisions, I construct effective marginal tax rates (described 
                                                 
10 The income from work, welfare, and disability (WWD income) comprises 70 percent of total income for single 
mothers over 1979 to 2001. 
11 Part of the incentive to include SSDI and food stamps in the conditioning set, rather than the choice set, stems 
from the fact that benefits are federally set and thus there is inadequate variation to identify price effects. Autor and 
Duggan (2003) get around this problem to some extent in their paper on SSDI by constructing time-varying and 
state-specific SSDI benefit replacement rates.  While this is a creative solution, it functions less like a “price” 
variable compared to state set AFDC and SSI benefit levels, and certainly compared to person-specific wage rates. 
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in the data section), linearize the constraint by taking the net prices in equation (4) as given and 
add a lump-sum transfer to nonlabor income to yield “virtual” other income equal to 
( )t t t t t tN N W h T Yτ= + − .  I then treat the net prices and virtual income as endogenous in 
estimation.  This is a common approach in the taxation and labor supply literature (MaCurdy, 
Green, and Paarsch 1990).  While the presence of transfer programs creates nonconvexities in the 
budget set and thus confounds the use of linearized budget constraints, the multiplicity of 
segments across different programs and tax systems, coupled with the fact that the single mother 
may cycle on and off programs and work within a year, implies that the budget set may be 
effectively convex (Moffitt 2002). Second, the difficulties associated with the dichotomous 
participation decisions in the utility function are mitigated somewhat by converting the discrete 
outcomes to continuous income shares.  This focus on budget shares is common in the 
consumption literature and also has been used to examine the tradeoff between the receipt of 
wage income versus fringe benefits (Woodbury 1983).  A number of identification and 
estimation challenges still arise from the existence of corner solutions, and these are discussed 
more fully in the next section. 
To operationalize the model a functional form is needed for indirect preferences. Because 
of its widespread use in the applied consumption literature, in part owing to its flexibility and 
desirable aggregation properties to conduct welfare analysis, I adopt the PIGLOG specification 
of indirect utility as (suppressing the conditioning variables zt and the stigma indicators): 
(5)  ln ln ( )
( )
t t
t
t
M a pV
b p
+=  .12 
The usual approach in the consumption literature is to adopt the following two price indices: 
                                                 
12 Note that a negative sign would typically replace the ‘+’ in equation (5) in the standard goods model.   
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(6a)  0
1ln ( ) ln ln ln
2k k kj k jk k j
a p p p pα α γ= + +∑ ∑ ∑ , 
and 
(6b)  ln ( ) lnk k
k
b p pβ=∑ ,  
which permit straightforward tests of behavioral restrictions such as adding-up ( 1k
k
α =∑ , 
0k
k
β =∑ , and 0kj
k
γ =∑ ), homogeneity ( 0kj
j
γ =∑ ), and symmetry ( jk kjγ γ= ).  The price 
indices are homogeneous degree zero ( ( )b p ) and degree one ( ( )a p ), respectively. 
 Applying Roy’s Identity to equation (5) and using equations (6a) and (6b) yields the 
system of income shares: 
(7)  ln ln
( )
t
it i ij jt i
j t
Ms p
a p
α γ β  = + +   ∑

, 
where it itit
t
p qs
M
≡  , , ,i c dq h I I= , is the income share of source i in the family’s total budget, and 
( )
t
t
M
a p

 is real WWD income.  This is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).  Following Browning and Meghir (1991), one can add the set of conditioning 
goods, including the potentially endogenous virtual other income term, transparently through the 
intercepts in equation (7), i.e. 0it i ip ipt
p
zα α α= +∑ . 
IV. Identification and Estimation 
The income shares in equation (7) tell us how changes in prices and income affect the 
relative shares of each WWD income source in the family’s total budget.  In order to identify 
these effects we need to specify the source of variation in prices and income, as well as the 
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sources of variation from other measured and unmeasured factors.  Given time series data on 
prices and income it is possible to estimate the parameters in equation (7); however, time series 
data mask important heterogeneity in labor-market, welfare, and disability program participation, 
including possible stigma effects, and the attendant heterogeneity in price responses.  To capture 
this heterogeneity I use pseudo panel data in which clusters of like individuals are grouped 
together, in this case by five-year birth cohort and three education levels, and the groups are 
followed over time (Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998).   
Specifically let n (= 1,…,N) denote the groups, t (=1,…,T) denote time, and rewrite 
equation (7) as: 
(8)  ln ln
( )
t
it it ij jt i in it it
j t
Ms p
a p
α γ β δ λ ε = + + + + +  ∑

, 
where inδ  is the group effect, itλ  is the time effect, and itε  is an error term which will be 
elaborated on below.  The specification in equation (8) yields exclusion restrictions needed for 
identification of price and income effects in that unobserved differences in average WWD 
income shares are captured by a permanent group effect and an additive time effect.  In many 
applications this assumption is sufficient; however, it is too strong for the model at hand because 
it implies that self-selection into work, welfare, or disability is captured by the group and time 
effects.  Given high rates of nonparticipation in the labor force among female heads of families 
with young children, especially those mothers with low education, and even higher rates of 
nonparticipation in AFDC and SSI among mothers with high school education or more, the 
model needs to account explicitly for corner solutions where the share equals zero.  Likewise, 
families may be wholly dependent on a single income source among the tM ; indeed, the notion 
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of eliminating “dependence” on welfare (AFDC share = 1) weighed heavily in the debates 
surrounding the 1996 welfare reform.        
I accommodate nonparticipation and dependence by adopting a two-limit Tobit-type 
model specification for the WWD income shares: 
(9)  max(0, ,1)it it n ts x π δ λ= + + , 
where xit is a vector containing demographics, prices, and the income terms.13  Under the 
assumption of normality the specification in (9) yields a fixed effects two-limit Tobit model.  It 
is widely believed that the so-called incidental parameters problem (i.e. the fact that the number 
of group effects grows with the number of groups) renders fixed-effect Tobit slope estimates 
inconsistent with a fixed number of time periods because estimation of the group effect is not 
separable from estimation of slope parameters in nonlinear models. However a recent simulation 
by Greene (2003) shows that in the case of the standard Tobit model the bias manifests itself in 
the variance parameter 2εσ  and not the slopes, and further that this bias gets small in modest-
sized T samples, i.e. 6T > .  While similar evidence is not available for the two-limit Tobit 
model, the underlying structure is the same and given that I have 23 years in my sample this bias 
should be minimal.   
Importantly, for identification one also needs the assumption that conditional on the 
group and time effect, prices grow differentially across groups over and above any changes in 
sample composition in the labor force, welfare programs, or disability programs.  If the only 
source of price variation is time then identification of (9) would not be possible.  However, I 
exploit the fact that the maximum benefit guarantees of AFDC and SSI vary both over time and 
                                                 
13 Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a flexible framework for estimating proportions data.  In their approach the 
outcome of interest lies within the unit interval, but the estimator can accommodate “nuisance” outcomes such a 0 
and 1.  In the model here, nonparticpation and dependence have important economic and policy implications, which 
makes the two-limit Tobit framework attractive.  
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across U.S. states, and with individual-level data on labor income, other income, and effective 
marginal tax rates I can exploit cohort-group and time-series variation in net AFDC benefits, net 
SSI benefits, and net wages as defined in equation (4) for estimation.   
Because the after-tax prices in equation (4) are functions of choice variables, either 
explicitly in the case of the size of the after-tax AFDC and SSI benefits as a function of earnings, 
or implicitly in the case of after-tax wages because the marginal tax rate is a function of earnings, 
the net prices must be treated as endogenous in estimation.  Furthermore, families may not derive 
any income from tM , leading to the possibility of non-random selection arising through the 
choice of positive tM .14  The combination of selection into WWD income, coupled with 
endogenous net prices and virtual other income in the income share equations, can be addressed 
straightforwardly in the Tobit framework of equation (9).   
Consider the problem of identifying the effects of net prices and virtual other income.  
Blundell et al. (1998), in a model of labor supply and taxation among married women in the 
U.K., argue that interactions of the group and time effects capture macro “shocks” to wages and 
taxes due to exogenous changes in tax policies and the wage structure (e.g. skill-biased 
technological change), and that these interactions serve as valid exclusion restrictions for 
identification of after-tax wages in their model. I follow a similar identification strategy here by 
exploiting the fact that reforms to the U.S. tax and welfare systems, coupled with the widely 
noted changes in the wage structure, differentially affected birth-year by education cohorts of 
single mothers over the past two decades. The ensuing reduced-form linear prediction equations 
of the after-tax prices (pj , j=w,c,d) and virtual other income ( tN ) for those observations with 
positive values of the respective net prices and other income are specified as a function of 
                                                 
14 As noted in the data section only around 5 percent on single mother families over 1979–2001 report 0tM = . 
 19
demographics (lt), group effects, time effects, and complete interactions of group and time 
effects: 
(10)  ( )jt j jt jn jt j jn jt jtg lς δ λ ψ δ λ ν= + + + × +  , g,j = pw, pc, pd, tN .          
Smith and Blundell (1986) show that the fitted residuals from the regressions in (10), ˆ jtν , can be 
included as extra regressors in a Tobit model like equation (9) to yield consistent estimates of the 
parameters π .  At the same time, this variable addition procedure allows one to test whether net 
prices and virtual other income are exogenous by testing the statistical significance of the fitted 
residuals.   
The additional econometric issue here is that the shares in equation (9) are undefined for 
families with 0tM = .  This possible non-random selection is handled in two ways; one, by 
permitting non-separabilities in preferences for income by conditioning the system on virtual 
other income, tN , and two, by estimating the reduced-form prediction equation (10) for tM by 
Tobit rather than OLS (i.e. including the observations with 0tM = ), constructing Tobit residuals 
for families with 0tM > , and estimating equation (9) with the fitted residuals for families with 
0tM > . This accounts explicitly for composition changes in wage, welfare, and disability 
income, and is an extension to the Tobit Type III method (Amemiya 1985).  The complete 
specification of the income share equations used in the two-limit Tobit model estimation is thus 
(11)  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln
( ) w c d
t
it it ij jt i in it p t p t p t Nt itMt
j t
Ms p
a p
α γ β δ λ υ υ υ υ υ ε = + + + + + + + + + +  ∑ 

.15     
                                                 
15 Asymptotic t-statistics are a valid method of testing the statistical significance of the coefficients on the residual 
variables.  However, strictly, one should adjust all standard errors for the presence of the generated regressors if the 
residual variables are found statistically significant (Wooldridge 2002).  I do not make this ex post adjustment in the 
results reported below. 
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 Finally, because I estimate an unrestricted system of WWD income share equations it is 
possible to test cross-equation restrictions such as symmetry of price effects in an auxiliary 
analysis with a minimum-distance estimator (Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber 1993; Browning 
and Meghir 1991).  Specifically, let the vector of unrestricted parameters be Γ  with dimension L 
and the symmetry restricted parameters be Θ  with dimension Q.  Under the null hypothesis of 
symmetry, HΓ = Θ , where H is a matrix of rank L – Q(Q–1)/2.  Given the unrestricted estimates, 
Γˆ , and the attendant variance-covariance matrix Ωˆ , the null hypothesis of symmetry can be 
tested by minimizing the criterion function  
(12)  1 2 ( 1) / 2ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) Q QH H χ− −′Ψ = Γ − Θ Ω Γ− Θ ∼         
with respect to Θ .  The restrictions can be tested by plugging the estimates Θˆ  back into the 
criterion function, Ψˆ , which is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom 
equal to Q(Q–1)/2. 
V. Data 
The data come from the 1980–2002 waves (1979–2001 calendar years) of the March 
Annual Demographic File of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The unit of observation is 
single female family heads between the ages of 18 and 60 who are not self employed, are not 
farmers, and who have children present under the age of 18.  In the CPS a family is defined as 
two or more persons related by birth, marriage or adoption.  The focus is on single female-
headed families with children because they have historically been the primary recipients of cash 
welfare.16  The total number of observations is 88,802 single female-headed families.  
                                                 
16 In results not tabulated I conducted a separate analysis of male-headed families.  Such families have always been 
eligible for SSI, whether single or married, and two-parent male-headed families were eligible for AFDC in half of 
the states prior to 1990, and in all states since 1990 (subject to some additional criteria on work effort of the primary 
breadwinner).  However, average participation rates among male heads were only 1.5 and 0.1 percent in each of 
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The families are then allocated to thirteen different five-year date of birth cohorts, and 
within each birth cohort, three separate education groups of less than high school, high school 
graduate, and more than high school, yielding thirty-nine separate birth-education cohorts.  In 
Table 1 I depict the distribution of families into the thirteen birth cohorts for each year of the 
sample.  From Table 1 it is clear that the five birth cohorts from 1939 to 1963 provide complete 
information over the sample period, but the contributions of the earlier and later cohorts also 
contain critical information for identification much like one would find in a standard unbalanced 
panel of families.  Recall that each cell in Table 1 is split into three education groups, so that a 
complete table has 897 cells.  Because the consistency of the grouping estimator is based in part 
on the number of observations per cell being large, I follow Blundell et al. (1998) and drop 
cohort-education cells with fewer than 50 observations from estimation. In addition there were 
121 women with hourly wages exceeding $500 per hour but with inconsistent data; thus, those 
observations were deleted. Finally, there were 4,421 women with no reported wage, AFDC, or 
SSI income.  These observations are included in the first-stage Tobit prediction equation (10) for 
tM , but not the second stage, leaving the final sample with 0tM >  used in estimation of the 
instrumental variables two-limit Tobit model in equation (11) at 80,495.   
    [Table 1 here] 
An important advantage of cohort-based data is that it is possible to characterize life-
cycle profiles by combining cohort averages by age.  In Figures 2–4 I present the life-cycle 
profiles of AFDC participation, SSI participation, and employment rates of single mothers for 
the thirteen birth cohorts by the three education groups.  Across all three education groups, 
Figure 2 reveals that AFDC participation declines with age, which is to be expected because 
                                                                                                                                                             
AFDC and SSI, and annual employment rates averaged 98 percent.  Hence, identification of the model with extreme 
forms of nonparticipation in transfer programs, coupled with high participation in work, was tenuous. 
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children under 18 years old “age” out of the household over time and thus program eligibility 
declines.  Another advantage of combining cohorts by age as in Figure 2 is that holding age fixed 
one can examine “cohort-specific” effects.  For example, more recent cohorts are less likely to 
participate in AFDC at a given age than older cohorts, which may explain some of the time-
series variation in Figure 1 via reduced entry onto the rolls (Grogger, Haider, and Klerman 
2003).  Figure 3 shows that SSI participation, especially for mothers with high-school or less, has 
a strong upward life-cycle trajectory, likely indicating that work-limiting disabilities are more 
common among older heads than younger ones.  Unlike AFDC, at each age younger cohorts are 
more likely to take up SSI than older cohorts.  Lastly, Figure 4 shows that single mothers’ life-
cycle employment rates follow an inverted U shape, as predicted by standard life-cycle models, 
but the more striking aspect of the figure is the strong cohort effect, i.e. that young cohorts of 
mothers are working at much greater rates than older cohorts.  These cohort-specific differences 
in participation rates form the basis for identification of this model.   
    [Figures 2–4 here] 
A. Gross Prices 
The variables used in the analysis draw from the CPS, coupled with state survey and 
administrative data, and income tax rates from the NBER TAXSIM program.  Variables from the 
CPS include annual real WWD income, tM , which is the sum of labor-market earnings of the 
family head, the family-level amount of annual AFDC income, and the family-level amount of 
annual SSI income.  The head’s gross hourly wage, Wt, also comes from the CPS, defined as the 
ratio of annual earnings to annual hours of work (annual weeks worked times usual hours per 
week).  For single mother families it is assumed that there is only one decision-maker present, 
making the head’s earnings and wages the appropriate metric of labor-market effort.  However, 
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the child (children) in the family may be the recipient of AFDC or SSI income and it is not 
possible to separate out child-only receipt from adult receipt, forcing analysts to resort to the 
family-level for AFDC and SSI income.  In addition, children in the family may receive labor-
market income.  This income is combined with other non-labor/non-AFDC/non-SSI income, 
including social security, private pension, SSDI, child support, alimony, rent/interest/dividends, 
and the dollar value of in-kind transfers such as food stamps, school lunch and breakfast, and 
housing assistance to form the “other” income variable, Nt. (Note that the EITC payment is 
included as part of the adjustment to make virtual income)  In a bid to simplify estimation, the 
price deflator used to construct real prices and incomes in equation (7), a(p), is proxied by the 
Consumer Price Index with 2001 base year.17    
I link several state-level variables to the CPS data using unique state identifiers for each 
family in the CPS.  Based on the literature review in Section II the model should control for 
general changes in the macroeconomy as well as changes in welfare policy.  To this end I obtain 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on state unemployment rates and data from the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to construct an indicator variable that equals 1 
as of the date when a state implemented either a pre-welfare reform waiver or their state TANF 
plan.18  Both variables vary across states and over time, variation which is needed to identify 
state-specific economic and policy effects from aggregate macro effects. In addition, because the 
maximum AFDC and SSI benefit guarantees, Gc and Gd, found in equation (4) are set at the state 
level I obtain data from selected issues of the Committee on Ways and Means Green Book on the 
                                                 
17 In the consumption literature this price index is sometimes proxied with the so-called Stone price index, which is 
a weighted sum of the prices, and in other cases the parameters of a(p) are estimated through an iterative-moment 
procedure.  Given the focus in this paper is on income shares, not goods consumption, deflating by the CPI is not 
likely to impart much bias.  
18 Unemployment rates are obtained from the URL: http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm; and data on welfare policies 
from the URL: http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/Waiver-Policies99/policy_CEA.htm.  
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maximum monthly AFDC benefit for a two-, three, and four-person family, and the SSI benefit 
for an individual living independently.  The AFDC benefit for a four-person family is used to 
proxy the gross price of welfare for families with four or more persons. The SSI benefit is 
provided as either an individual benefit or a couple benefit, and for each group it varies whether 
or not the person or couple lives independently (i.e. not in care).  In light of the fact that my 
sample is drawn from the non-institutionalized population, and focus is on single parent families, 
I use the independent individual-level SSI benefit as the gross price of disability. 
    [Figures 5–7 here] 
Figures 5–7 depict the type of gross price variation needed to help identify relative price 
effects on work, welfare, and disability.  In Figure 5 I plot the time series of average cross-state 
real weekly wages, real AFDC maximum benefit guarantees (for three-person families), and real 
SSI maximum benefit guarantees. Weekly wages are used in Figure 5 so the scale is comparable 
to AFDC and SSI benefits. As SSI benefits are indexed to inflation, average SSI benefits are 
constant over the two decade period in Figure 5.  Likewise, average real weekly wages are 
relatively flat in the 1980s, though there is a sharp increase beginning in the mid 1990s, 
reflecting the rising reward to work for single mothers. However, AFDC is not indexed and 
because states kept nominal benefits fixed for much of the period, inflation has eroded the real 
return to welfare participation.  Indeed, even in the mid 1980s both SSI and employment were 
becoming more attractive on average relative to welfare, and by the mid 1990s there was a strong 
gross price incentive to substitute away from AFDC and toward SSI and work. 
As described in Section IV, time series variation is not sufficient to permit identification 
of price effects in the model in equations (5) and (6).  Figures 6 and 7 reveal that there is ample 
cross-section variation as well as time variation.  Figure 6 presents life-cycle real hourly wages 
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by education group, akin to Figures 2–4.  It is clear that life-cycle wages follow the usual hump 
shape, but it is also clear that at any given age more recent cohorts have realized higher wages 
compared to older cohorts.  In Figure 7 I present the cross-state standard deviation in the AFDC 
and SSI maximum guarantees for each year (i.e. the “between-group” variation).  While it is not 
surprising that cross-state variation is higher with AFDC than SSI because only half the states 
supplement the federal SSI benefit for individuals living independently, whereas the AFDC 
benefit is strictly set at the state level, there is still considerable variation in gross SSI benefits 
across states to be optimistic that identification will be achieved. 
B. Net Prices 
The tax function in equation (3) and the attendant net prices in equation (4) are very 
complicated nonlinear functions of labor income, nonlabor income, and assorted deductions and 
exemptions.  Modeling all the various kinks, corners, and holes across the budget frontier over 
twenty-three years is impractical.  Instead, I construct effective marginal tax rates for use in 
constructing net prices by combining data from three sources.  First, I construct estimates of 
direct income tax rates across the federal, state, payroll, and EITC tax schedules from 1979 to 
2001 for each of the 80,450 female heads using the NBER TAXSIM program.  Specifically, the 
TAXSIM module calls for basic information on labor income, nonlabor income, dependents, and 
certain deductions such as property tax payments and child care expenses, and from this 
information calculates a federal marginal tax rate, the state marginal tax rate, and the payroll tax 
rate.19  The federal and state marginal tax rates include the respective EITC code for each tax 
year and state, thus allowing for the possibility of negative marginal rates.  The TAXSIM payroll 
                                                 
19 The CPS does not have information on certain inputs to the TAXSIM program such as annual rental payments, 
child care expenses, or other itemized deductions.  I set these values to zero when calculating the marginal tax rate, 
but  I do not expect these omissions to impart much bias among the sample of single mothers who tend to use the 
standard deduction. 
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rate assumes that the worker bears the full burden of the payroll tax (employer and employee 
share), which implies perfectly inelastic labor supply.  Since the latter is a behavioral response 
estimated as part of the system, and not simply assumed, I only assess the employee share.     
Along with the direct tax rates on wages I construct implicit marginal tax rates for the 
AFDC and SSI programs.  Several authors have noted that because of the widely divergent 
AFDC programs across states and over time, and also substantial within-state variation in 
program implementation across counties within a state, that the statutory benefits and marginal 
tax rates in AFDC (100 percent over most of this sample period) bear little resemblance to the 
effective guarantees and tax rates (Fraker, et al. 1985; McKinnish, et al. 1999).  To estimate 
effective guarantees and rates these authors use quality control data by state from the AFDC 
program to run (truncated) regressions of the following form: 
(13)  ,1 ,20 1 32 3 ( ) ,
c c
t t t t t t t t tB K K W h Nρ ρ ρ τ τ υ= + + − − +  
where Bt is the actual monthly benefit payment of the family in the survey month, K2t is an 
indicator variable equal to one if there are two or more children under age 18 in the family, and 
K3t is the number of children greater than two.  Estimates of effective guarantees (i.e. benefits 
for those with no additional income) for two-, three-, or four-person families are found from the 
estimated coefficients 0 0 1 0 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ+ + +  respectively, while estimates of the effective tax 
rate on labor income and nonlabor income are ,1ˆctτ  and ,2ˆctτ .  I obtained AFDC quality control 
data from the Urban Institute (http://afdc.urban.org/ ) over the period 1983–1997 to run similar 
regressions.  Because McKinnish et al. (1999) report little difference between the statutory 
maximum AFDC benefit and the effective benefit, a result that I verify here, I use the statutory 
 27
benefit guarantee but the estimated effective tax rates from equation (13) in construction of the 
net AFDC price as defined in equation (4).20 
 The comparable quality control data for the SSI program to estimate effective SSI tax 
rates is available only for a single year in 2001 (http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/microdata/ssr/).  
I use this data to construct effective state-specific SSI marginal rates, ,1ˆdtτ  and ,2ˆdtτ , and assume 
these rates are applicable for the whole sample period.  While it would be preferred to have data 
available akin to that from the AFDC program, the assumption of time-invariant effective tax 
rates for SSI is likely to be reasonable. Because of the much greater federal oversight of the SSI 
program, aside from state supplementation of benefit payments, and the fact that the statutory 
rates (50 percent for earned income, 100 percent for nonlabor income) and deductions ($65 for 
monthly earnings, $20 for monthly nonlabor income) were constant over the 1979 to 2001 
period, there is likely to be much more stability in SSI effective rates over time.21  Hence, I use 
the estimated effective rates in lieu of the statutory rates because the former are more likely to 
reflect actual rates faced by the family owing to the fact that SSI claims are handled at local 
Social Security offices.22   
     [Tables 2 and 3 here] 
I conclude the data section with a brief examination of summary statistics in Tables 2 and 
3.  In Table 2 we see that for female-headed families there are sharp distinctions across education 
                                                 
20 Data from the AFDC quality control before 1983 are limited.  Fraker et al (1985) present results on effective tax 
rates for the 1979–1982 period, and I use those estimates in my analysis.  In cases where rates are missing due to 
insufficient sample size in the AFDC-QC data I use the average rate in the surrounding years to impute the missing 
value.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has not made QC data on the TANF program publicly 
available after 1997.  Hence I make a simplifying assumption and assume that the effective rate is constant in each 
year after 1997.  I address this assumption in sensitivity analyses later in the paper.  
21 Strictly the first $20 of income from any source is disregarded, but in this case I assess it first to nonlabor income. 
Many types of unearned income are exempt from implicit taxation by the SSI program, including AFDC benefits, 
and the dollar value of federal food and housing assistance benefits. See “Understanding Supplemental Security 
Income” (2004) at http://www.ssa.gov/notices/supplemental-security-income/text-income-ussi.htm for details.  
22 In results not tabulated I constructed the net SSI price using statutory rates and deductions. There was no change 
in the qualitative results reported below, and little change in the quantitative values. 
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groups with respect to participation in AFDC, SSI, and employment.  Among female heads with 
less than high school the income shares of AFDC and work are nearly identical, 49 and 45 
percent respectively, with the remaining 6 percent going to SSI.  However, as education 
increases, reliance on wage income relative to welfare or disability income grows considerably.  
This is made clear toward the bottom of Table 2 where I report the fraction of non-participation 
and the fraction reporting dependence on a single income source.  With the possible exception of 
the SSI program, these average fractions suggest that the two-limit Tobit rather than the single-
limit Tobit model is justified. While average gross AFDC and SSI maximum benefits do vary 
somewhat across education groups, variation across education levels in average gross wages, 
average marginal tax rates, average WWD income, and average other income sources is 
pronounced.   
Table 3 examines the distribution of marginal tax rates and net prices in more detail 
during the peaks of the last three business cycles.  At the 25th percentile the federal marginal tax 
rate has become considerably more negative over the past two decades, reflecting the subsidy 
offered by the EITC program; however, federal marginal tax rates have actually risen at the 
median and 75th percentiles even in light of the major tax cuts of 1981, 1986, and 2001.  
Estimated state marginal tax rates are zero at the 25th and 50th percentiles, but have increased 
from 3 percent in 1979 to 4.4 percent in 1999.  On the contrary the payroll tax rate affects the 
first three quartiles the same and the burden has risen considerably over the last decades.  
Summing up across the latter three tax rates shows that the cumulative marginal tax rate for a 
mother at the 25th percentile has fallen from –0.039 to –0.263, but the cumulative rate for the 
mother at the 75th percentile has risen 30 percent from 0.331 to 0.431.  A simple ‘difference-in-
difference’ calculation suggests that the inter-quartile range (i.e. the difference between the 75th 
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and 25th percentiles) in direct marginal tax rates rose 32 percentage points between 1979 and 
2001. These trends reflect changes both in tax policy (higher subsidies for the poor) as well as in 
the higher incomes of single mothers in the top end of the income distribution that placed them 
in relatively higher marginal tax brackets. 
The next four panels in Table 3 reveal several patterns about effective tax rates on 
earnings and nonlabor income in the AFDC and SSI programs.  First, the effective rates are 
considerably lower than the statutory rates of 100 percent in the case of AFDC and 50 
percent/100 percent in the case of SSI. Second, the rates assessed on earnings and nonlabor 
income diverge, as found in Fraker et al. (1985) and McKinnish et al. (1999).  Lastly, in the case 
of AFDC there is a secular decline in the effective rates assessed on both earned and unearned 
income.  This is consistent with the goal of “making work pay” that was a prominent part of the 
welfare waivers and TANF program in the 1990s.  As a consequence, while the sum of federal, 
state, payroll, AFDC, and SSI tax rates took a sizable bite out of the gross wage rate as seen by 
the net wages in 1979 and 1989, just when gross wages took off in the 1990s, cumulative tax 
rates (direct and implicit) fell, making the net reward to work significantly more attractive.  
Importantly, the secular decline in gross AFDC prices outweighed the concomitant decline in 
effective tax rates on AFDC so that the net price of AFDC fell relative to the net price of SSI.  
VI. Results 
 In this section I present results from estimating the two-limit Tobit instrumental variables 
income share models in equation (11).  In addition to prices and income and the attendant first-
stage residuals to account for non-random selection into WWD income and possible endogeneity 
of net prices and virtual other income, each specification controls for basic demographics such as 
the race of the family head and the number of children under age 18 present, for state 
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unemployment rates and indicators for implementation of state-specific welfare reforms, and for 
date-of-birth by education cohort fixed effects as well as fixed time effects. 23  Because there 
might be a residual source of latent heterogeneity over and above the birth-year by education 
cohort effects at the state level that could confound the effects of welfare and disability prices on 
the WWD income shares, I present a parallel set of estimates that include state fixed effects.  
 In Table 4 I record the results from the instrumental variables two-limit Tobit model for 
female-headed families. The results in the first column indicate that the share of WWD income 
going to AFDC is increasing in the generosity of the AFDC maximum benefit guarantee, in the 
number of children, and in the state unemployment rate.  The latter implies that welfare 
utilization is countercyclical, which is consistent with the aggregate AFDC caseload literature 
(Ziliak et al. 2000), while the positive signs on the welfare benefit and on number of children 
align with priors based on demand theory in the case of the former and in the latter case with 
ample evidence that poverty and welfare reliance is increasing in family size.  There is strong 
evidence in the first column of Table 4 that higher wages, SSI benefit generosity, WWD income, 
and virtual other income are associated with lower shares of welfare income.  This implies that 
work and SSI are substitutes for welfare. The first-stage residuals indicate that non-random 
selection is present, i.e. the WWD income residual is statistically significant, and that it is 
necessary to instrument each of the net price and other income variables.  
[Table 4 here] 
 The results for the SSI share in column (2) largely parallel those in the AFDC share 
equation in terms of qualitative signs; namely the SSI share is increasing in its own price and in 
the number of children, but decreasing in the prices of AFDC and work.  That SSI shares 
                                                 
23 The number of parameters in the first-stage regressions is unwieldy and are not presented for brevity.  They are 
available from the author upon request.  The exclusion restrictions are jointly different from zero (p-value < 0.00) in 
each of the first-stage regressions.  
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increase with the number of children is broadly consistent with the model of Kubik (1999) in that 
as the family size grows there is a strong incentive to apply for SSI benefits for one or more 
children given the higher marginal benefits.  There are some differences in the SSI model 
compared to the AFDC model.  First, the SSI share is statistically independent of both WWD 
income and other income, rather than declining as in the AFDC share model.  Second, there is no 
evidence of non-random selection into WWD income.  Third, SSI shares are statistically 
independent of welfare waivers, whereas the AFDC share is lower after welfare reform.   
 In the third column the earnings share is strongly positively related to the net wage rate, 
indicative of an upward-sloping uncompensated labor supply schedule for women, and 
significantly negatively related to the prices of welfare and disability.  The earnings share is 
increasing in both income terms, and while the positive sign on the virtual other income term 
implies that leisure is inferior, this is not an uncommon finding in either the male or female labor 
supply literature (Pencavel 1986; Mroz 1987).  The results in column (3) also suggest that the 
earnings share moves procyclically with the state business cycle, is higher for white single 
mothers than for non-white mothers, and is positively affected by welfare reform.  The latter 
could arise from both “carrot” and “stick”—carrots that made work with welfare more attractive 
such as higher earnings disregards, and sticks that made welfare less attractive than work 
because of new rules time limiting welfare.   
 In columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 I record the estimates of the same unrestricted share 
equations but with the addition of state fixed effects.  The parameter estimates are remarkably 
robust with the inclusion of the 50 state dummy variables, suggesting that the identification 
scheme is not spuriously linked to state fixed heterogeneity.  There are only a couple of 
differences worth note with the inclusion of state fixed effects.  One is that the SSI share is no 
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longer responsive to the state unemployment rate, and the earnings share is less responsive to the 
state economy.  In addition, with state fixed effects the negative influence of welfare waivers on 
the AFDC share is eliminated, and the positive influence on earnings shares is muted, suggesting 
that the waivers largely reflected state-specific time-invariant welfare policy differences.   
The cross-price effects in each equation indicate the each share is a substitute for the 
other income sources.  I test whether or not these effects are symmetric with the chi-square test 
of symmetry from the minimum distance estimator in equation (12), and record the values at the 
bottom of Table 4.  The estimated test statistic values of 186 for columns (1)-(3) and 217 for 
columns (4)-(6), each with three degrees of freedom, soundly reject the null hypothesis that the 
cross-price effects are symmetric.  
A.  Elasticities at the Extensive and Intensive Margins 
The coefficients in Table 4 provide information on the qualitative relationships between 
the income shares and explanatory variables, but do not offer much guidance on economic 
magnitudes of the relationships. The reason for this is because unlike a true censoring application 
the estimated coefficients from the (two-limit) Tobit model with corner solutions do not carry 
much meaning (Wooldridge 2002); that is, to examine economic magnitudes with corner 
solution applications we need to examine the response at both the extensive (participation and 
dependence) and the intensive (unconditional mean) margins.   
The unconditional mean for any given share equation in the two-limit Tobit model is 
(Maddala 1983): 
(14)  1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ,i i i i i i i i i iE s L R Lσ φ φ′= Φ +Ψ Φ −Φ + − + −Φ  
where L1i and L2i are the lower (0) and upper (1) limits of the share, Ψ  is the full vector of 
unknown parameters from equation (11), R is the full vector of regressors from equation (11), 
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and upper limits, σ  is the standard deviation, and 1 21 2,i i i ii iL R L Rφ φ φ φσ σ
′ ′−Ψ −Ψ   = =        are 
the normal density functions at the lower and upper limits.  For a change in any continuous 
variable Rj the change in the unconditional mean of the income share is  
(15)  2 1
( ) ( ).i j i i
j
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R
∂ = Ψ Φ −Φ∂  
Point elasticities are calculated by multiplying both sides of equation (15) by the ratio of 
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j
i
R
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.  
Noting that the probability of ever being on welfare (or on SSI or working), i.e. the participation 
margin, is 11 i−Φ , the effect of a change in any continuous variable on the decision to participate 
is 1 1
(1 ) ji
i
jR
φσ
Ψ∂ −Φ =∂ .  Likewise, the probability of dependence on welfare (or SSI or work) is 
21 i−Φ  such that the marginal effect of a continuous variable on dependence is 
2
2
(1 ) ji
i
jR
φσ
Ψ∂ −Φ =∂ . Elasticities are straightforward to calculate by multiplying the partial effect 
by the ratio of the regressor to one minus the cdf.  As discussed in Wooldridge (2002) consistent 
estimates of the average partial effect (elasticity) in the context of a Tobit model with 
endogenous regressors can be found by computing the means of the nonlinear functions, rather 
than evaluating the function at mean values of variables.  This is the approach followed here, and 
after some tedious calculations standard errors are computed using the so-called delta method. 
     [Table 5 here] 
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 Table 5 contains the average own and cross-price elasticities of demand for wage, 
welfare, and disability income at the extensive (ever participate and dependence) and intensive 
margins (unconditional mean).  I present estimates both for the base case without state fixed 
effects and for the case with state effects, but focus discussion on the state-effects models.  First 
with respect to the AFDC share equation, the own price elasticities of demand for AFDC income 
are a sizable 0.63, 0.71, and 1.05 at the participation, unconditional mean, and dependence 
margins.  That is, a 10 percent increase in the net AFDC price raises the likelihood of ever 
participating by 6.3 percent, raises the share of AFDC by 7.1 percent, and raises the likelihood of 
dependence by 10.5 percent.  The cross price elasticities of the AFDC share with respect to the 
net price of SSI at the three margins are –0.74, –0.84, and –1.23, and with respect to the net wage 
are –1.0, –1.1, and –1.7.  These large responses suggest that the “pull” out of welfare and into 
SSI or work is quite strong.  Indeed, between 1979 and 1999 the income share of AFDC fell 
nearly two-thirds on average, and average real after-tax hourly wages rose by just over one-third, 
indicating that net wage gains among single mothers, all else equal, can account for just over 
one-half of the average decline in AFDC income shares over the past two decades (based on the 
unconditional mean elasticity of –1.1). 
 The estimates in Table 5 also reveal that the SSI share is quite responsive to its own 
price, as well as to the net AFDC price and the net wage.  In particular there is a large 
participation response into and out of SSI when AFDC benefits change.  For example, the 
estimated SSI participation elasticity with respect to AFDC of about –0.6 suggests that the 50 
percent decline between 1979 and 1999 in the average net AFDC benefit would lead to a 30 
percent increase in ever participating in SSI.  Given that SSI participation rose about 70 percent 
 35
between 1979 and 1999 for single-mother families, all else equal, the relative price variation can 
account for upwards of 40 percent of that growth.   
 Interestingly, the elasticities in Table 5 indicate that net price changes in either AFDC or 
SSI have a comparatively dampened impact on earnings—a 10 percent increase in AFDC or SSI 
benefits lowers the earnings share by about 1.5 percent.  However, earnings shares of single 
mothers are quite responsive to their own wage possibilities, with the participation elasticity 
being about 0.3, the mean elasticity about 0.4, and the dependence elasticity about 0.824 All else 
equal, with the mean share elasticity of 0.4, the mean increase in the net wage of one-third can 
account for upwards of one-half of the 27 percent increase in the earnings share between 1979 
and 1999.   
 B. Morishima Elasticities of Substitution 
 In addition to own- and cross-price elasticities the parameter estimates in Table 4 can be 
used to construct elasticities of substitution, which indicate the ease of substitution between the 
income shares as well as changes in relative income shares when relative prices change.  The 
usual metric for this purpose is the so-called Allen partial elasticity of substitution.  However, 
Blackorby and Russell (1989) demonstrate that the Allen elasticity contains no new information 
over the cross-price elasticities when there are more than two goods in the system.  Instead, they 
propose a new measure called the Morishima elasticity of substitution (in honor of Morishima, 
who independently derived a similar measure but was never translated from the original 
Japanese).  The MES between any two goods i and j is  
(16) H Hij ji iiMES η η= − , 
                                                 
24 Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) find similar sized or larger elasticities of female labor supply using data from the 
Survey of Income Programs and Participation.  They did not consider welfare programs in their analysis. 
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where ,H Hji iiη η  are the cross and own compensated (Hicksian) elasticities of demand.  Blackorby 
and Russell (1989) discuss at length how and why the MES is inherently asymmetric across price 
changes.  In the context of the income share model estimated in Table 4 we expect MES < 0 
because we find that the income sources are substitutes, 0Hjiη < , and that shares are increasing in 
their own price, 0Hiiη > .  
[Table 6 here] 
 In Table 6 I record the estimated Morishima elasticities of substitution at the mean values 
of the elasticities.  To read the table, note, for example, that the second row containing the SSI 
benefit reveals the elasticity of substitution between AFDC and SSI, and earnings and SSI, 
respectively.  The ease of substitution increases as the elasticity increases in absolute value.  
From Table 6 it appears that there is relative ease in substituting into and out of all forms of 
income.  The relative ease of substitution into and out of SSI is consistent with the sizable 
elasticities reported in Table 5 and indicates that there may be less difficulties in moving across 
programs than prior beliefs might suggest.25  
C. Sensitivity Analyses 
Before proceeding with policy simulations and welfare analysis I examine the sensitivity 
of the results to several model assumptions.  For convenience I report the implications of the 
assumptions in terms of the extensive and intensive margin elastiticites.  The first test addresses 
two issues simultaneously—whether the 1996 welfare reform is the driving force for the 
substitution patterns identified, and the potential bias of assuming constant effective AFDC tax 
                                                 
25 I am not aware of any previous estimates on the elasticity of substitution across work, welfare, and disability.  As 
discussed below I re-estimated the models with the gross prices in place of the net prices.  In this case it was less 
easy to substitute into and out of SSI, which aligns with priors because of the disability determination process.  The 
use of net prices of SSI here, which, to my knowledge, is the first such application, suggests that it is no more 
difficult to substitute income from SSI than other programs.  More research on this issue is needed.  
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rates after 1997 due to the lack of quality control data.  The large swings in the time series of 
AFDC and work depicted in Figure 1 began in the mid 1990s just as federal welfare legislation 
was taking shape.  Hence, it is plausible that the economic magnitudes of the elasticities reported 
in Table 5 are driven by the welfare-reform data.  In Table 7 I report the attendant elasticities 
evaluated at the means based on parameter estimates from equation (11), but with a restricted 
sample period of 1979 to 1996.  Comparing columns (1)–(3) in Table 7 to columns (4)–(6) of 
Table 5 shows that the elasticity estimates are little changed with the restricted sample period.  
Indeed the SSI share elasticities are larger in absolute value in Table 7 than in Table 5, possibly 
due to new restrictions placed on eligibility for child SSI benefits after 1996.  That the elasticities 
are robust overall to the shorter time series coincides with evidence presented earlier that the 
relative returns to SSI and work began to increase as early as the mid 1980s as inflation eroded 
the real value of AFDC benefits. 
[Table 7 here] 
The model in equation (11) is based on the assumption that selection occurs via the 
combined sum of wage, welfare, and disability income ( tM ) and that the first-stage Tobit for 
WWD income adequately controls for selection. Hence, least-squares predictors for net wages 
and benefits and virtual income are valid methods of controlling for their endogeneity in 
estimation.  I test this assumption by estimating first-stage Tobit models of equation (10) for all 
income and price terms, and then including Tobit residuals in the second-stage two-limit Tobit 
model of equation (11).  I record the results of this test in columns (4)–(6) of Table 7.  There are 
no qualitative changes in the estimated elasticities under the first-stage Tobit assumption; 
however, the absolute values of the elasticites exceed the base-case estimates in Table 5 in most 
cases, and indeed, in some cases seem implausibly large, notably the elasticities of AFDC and 
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SSI with respect to the net wage.  These results do not cast doubt on the base case reported in 
Table 5, and one might interpret those estimates as conservative.       
As a final check I examine the importance of controlling for direct and implicit taxation 
by setting the marginal tax rates equal to zero in equation (4) and instead use real gross wages 
and benefits, as well as other income without the lump-sum virtual-income transfer. I still 
account for possible non-random selection in WWD income, i.e. 0tM > , by estimating the first 
stage Tobit model in equation (10) for tM  and including the fitted residual as an additional 
regressor.  I addition I allow for the possibility that the gross hourly wage and “other” nonlabor 
income (Nt) are endogenous by including fitted residuals from first-stage least-squares 
predictions of wages and other income based on the specification in equation (10).  However, 
AFDC and SSI prices are treated as exogenous, and are allowed to be non-zero for all mothers 
and not just actual AFDC and SSI recipients.  While this exercise is “fictional” in the sense that 
taxes are not zero, it is not without policy interest because the gross AFDC and SSI prices reflect 
the potential payoff from participation in each program in the absence of income from other 
sources.   
I record the results of using gross prices in panel B of Table 7.  While many of the results 
are robust to using the simpler gross prices rather than net prices, there are two important 
differences, both related to the SSI program.  First, under the gross price assumption I find that 
the SSI share is declining in the SSI gross price, which is contrary to demand theory, though the 
unconditional mean elasticity is not statistically significant.  Second, the results in column (3) of 
panel B indicate that SSI and work are complements and not substitutes.  This is theoretically 
possible, but in light of the strong results in Table 5 that indicate the earnings share is declining 
in the net SSI price, the gross-price model in Table 7 is likely to be misspecified.  
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D. Policy Simulations and Welfare Analysis 
A key feature of deriving the system of equations from an indirect preference function is 
that the estimated parameters can be used in counterfactual policy experiments to determine 
possible welfare losses or gains from alternative policy prescriptions.  In this section I use the 
estimated parameters reported in Table 4 to simulate how the expected shares of AFDC, SSI, and 
earnings (based on the unconditional mean formula in equation (14)) respond to changes in 
relative prices.  In addition I use those same parameters to simulate out the fraction of families 
that have welfare improvements after the various policy reforms. For the latter, I construct the 
baseline indirect utility function in equations (5) and (6), denoted as 0ˆV .  The attendant baseline 
cost function is  
(17)  0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ln ( )C C V p V b p a p≡ = − , 
where 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆln ( ), ( ) exp(ln( ( ))a p b p b p≡  are the fitted price indices from estimation.  In conducting 
welfare changes after policy reforms to prices I hold well being constant at the initial level and 
examine changes in the “cost” of reaching the reference utility level by altering the price, i.e. 
0 1 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )C C V p C V p∆ = −  for a change in prices from p0 to p1 (King 1983). Beneficial reforms 
raise welfare by lowering the cost of living; that is, ˆ 0C∆ < .   
It is important to note that because the price index ˆ( )b p  is equal to zero if any one of the 
three net prices is equal to zero, the indirect utility function in equation (5) is undefined in those 
situations, which is the case for most families in the sample.  Instead, I replace the actual net 
prices with their predicted values from the first-stage prediction equations (10).  That is, for each 
family I assign the net price that they would receive in expectation if they were to actually 
participate.  Then for each policy reform I consider I first estimate the least-squares prediction 
 40
equations (10) using the new price variable as the dependent variable on those families with 
positive net prices and then use the fitted values as proxies as if they did participate in each of 
the programs and the labor force.  These predictions are also used construct the post-reform 
expected shares using the formulas in equation (14).   
I consider five separate price reforms, three to the AFDC program and two to the wage 
structure.  In the first reform to AFDC I fix the prices at their 1979 real levels.  This is intended 
to simulate what would have happened to the shares of AFDC, SSI, and earnings had the AFDC 
benefit been indexed to inflation and kept constant in real terms over the past two decades.  For 
the next reform I assume that each state only offers a single benefit regardless of family size, in 
this case the benefit for a family with one adult and two dependent children.  This exercise is 
akin to imposing a “family cap,” which is a policy adopted in about half the states after the 1996 
welfare reform whereby the benefit is fixed at the previous level after a new child enters the 
family unit.  In the third reform to AFDC I assume that the gross benefit varies across family size 
but that the benefit is uniform across all states and held constant in real terms, which is similar to 
the current rules governing the Food Stamp Program.  To implement this reform I set the family-
size specific benefit equal to the median state benefit in 1979.  For the first reform to wages I 
assume that the wage structure is fixed at its level in 1979, prior to the two-decade climb in wage 
inequality and also the productivity induced wage growth of the late 1990s.  To implement this 
reform I estimate net wages using the sample of mothers in 1979, and then use the coefficients to 
predict wages for each ensuing person year.  Finally, I turn to a long-standing exercise in the tax 
literature of simulating how behavior changes in response to the elimination of direct taxation.  
In this case, I assume that implicit taxation via the AFDC and SSI systems still exists, but 
federal, state, and payroll taxes are eliminated, including the EITC. 
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[Table 8 here] 
 In Table 8 I record the results of the five simulations.  For each reform I report the 
percentage changes in the AFDC, SSI, and earnings shares, each relative to the predicted 
baseline, as well as the percentage of families that experience welfare gains after the reform.  I 
record the results at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for each peak year of the past three 
business cycles.  Fixing the AFDC benefit at its 1979 level has little effect on behavior in the 
baseline year of 1979, as expected, but there are very large responses in both 1989 and 1999.  
Specifically, because inflation substantially eroded the real value of AFDC during the 1980s and 
1990s, fixing the gross benefit at its 1979 level suggests more than a doubling of the AFDC share 
at the median by 1999.  However, the higher relative price of nonparticipation in AFDC results 
in sizable predicted declines in both SSI and earnings such that by 1999 there are no families 
better off in expectation under this reform.26 This result highlights the importance of wage 
growth to single mothers well being in the late 1990s. 
 In the next panel of Table 8 we see that imposing a family cap raises the AFDC share by 
about 8–15 percent at the median because families who previously received a lower two-person 
benefit now qualify for the higher three-person benefit.  However, because the SSI and earnings 
shares fall by only 7 and 2 percent at the median, respectively, well being improves for about 24 
percent of families in each year.  The third panel shows what happens to simulated shares and 
well being if the AFDC program had instead offered an inflation-adjusted uniform benefit across 
states.  In the baseline year the AFDC, SSI, and earnings shares are little changed at the median, 
but about 50 percent of families have higher welfare. The reason for this is in part an artifact of 
setting the benefit at the median state in 1979, which means higher AFDC benefits for those with 
                                                 
26 Clearly actual AFDC families with no other income source are better off under this reform because the higher 
benefit places them on a higher indifference curve (see Moffitt 2003 for a graphical exposition of similar reforms).  
What the simulation shows is the opportunity cost of welfare use compared to taking up SSI or work. 
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actual prices less than the median, but lower benefits for those above the median and thus higher 
SSI and earnings shares.  Two decades later, however, the simulated effects of the uniform 
benefit are much like the previous reform where benefits were fixed at the 1979 levels.  That is, 
predicted shares of AFDC are more than double the actual predicted baseline level, while 
predicted shares of SSI are 35 percent lower and shares of earnings are 12 percent lower.  As a 
consequence there are no winners from this reform in expectation given the wage and SSI benefit 
structures in 1999. 
 The last two panels in Table 8 contain the reforms to the wage structure.  In the first case 
of imposing the wage structure from 1979 onto the rest of the sample years we see that in 1989 at 
the median the predicted shares of AFDC and SSI each rise about 10 percent, and earnings 
shares fall about 3 percent.  On average about 48 percent of the single mother families in 1989 
would have benefited from this reform.  The reason for this is that the lower predicted wages 
increased the reward to participation in both AFDC and SSI, which benefited about half the 
families.  By 1999, the median predicted share of AFDC is about 40 percent higher and the share 
of SSI is just under 30 percent higher, while the earnings share is 7 percent lower.  However, 
even though two of the three income shares are higher, only about one-fourth of single mothers 
in 1999 would have been better off under the 1979 wage structure both because actual real wages 
were much higher in 1999 than in 1979 and because of the higher weight given to earnings in the 
utility function.  Finally, removal of federal, state, and payroll taxation results in welfare 
improvements for 85 to 90 percent of single mothers across the business cycle peaks.  
Interestingly, the simulated earnings response in 1999 is much lower than the distribution of 
responses in 1979.  This reflects the large expansions in both the standard deduction and the 
EITC during the 1980s and 1990s, which substantially lowered effective tax burdens on single 
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mothers by 1999 such that the positive earnings response of removal of state and payroll taxes is 
offset by the negative earnings response of removal of the EITC subsidy in this reform.    
VII. Conclusion  
 I examined the role that changes in relative prices across work, welfare, and disability 
played in explaining the epochal economic developments among single female-headed families 
over the past two decades.  I modeled labor supply and transfer-program participation decisions 
in the context of an Almost Ideal Demand System that admits corner solutions, nonseparability 
of preferences over income sources, endogenous wages and incomes, and latent heterogeneity 
across birth-cohort and education levels and across U.S. states. Using the Current Population 
Survey I constructed date of birth-by-education cohorts for single female-headed families 
spanning the calendar years 1979 to 2001, and matched individual and family-level data in the 
CPS with family-specific direct income tax rates from the NBER TAXSIM program as well as 
state-specific and time-varying benefit levels and effective tax rates in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program and the Supplemental Security Income program.    
I found strong evidence of sizable own and cross-programmatic substitution effects in 
income shares.  Among single female heads of families the elasticity of ever participating in 
AFDC with respect to the after-tax AFDC benefit is +0.6, it is –0.7 with respect to the after-tax 
SSI benefit, and –1.0 with respect to the after-tax real wage, and the corresponding intensive 
margin elasticities at the means were +0.7, –0.8, and –1.1, respectively. These elasticities provide 
insight into the role of relative prices in accounting for changes in work, welfare, and disability.  
For example, between 1979 and 1999 the increase in the generosity of SSI relative to AFDC 
accounts for about 40 percent of the average growth in SSI, while the increase in real wages 
accounts for about one-half of the average decline in AFDC shares over the past two decades. 
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The estimated elasticities of substitution provided corroborative evidence that families not only 
substituted across income sources, but that they did so with some ease.  
I conducted a number of counterfactual policy experiments on the AFDC program such 
as indexing the AFDC benefit at its real 1979 level and introducing a uniform inflation-adjusted 
federal AFDC benefit much like the current Food Stamp Program.  Each of these reforms 
predicted a sizable increase in the share of income accruing to AFDC.  However, the higher 
relative price of nonparticipation in AFDC resulted in sizable predicted declines in both SSI and 
earnings such that by 1999 there are no families better off in expectation under these reforms. 
These simulations highlight the importance of before- and after-tax wage growth to well being of 
single mothers in the late 1990s.  Collectively the estimates presented here imply that relative 
price changes across work, welfare, and disability over the past two decades lead to a substantial 
“pull” out of cash welfare and into expanded reliance on employment and disability as a means 
of financial support.   
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Figure 1: AFDC, SSI, & Work Participation by Education, 1979-2001
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Figure 2: Life-Cycle AFDC Participation by Education
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Figure 3: Life-Cycle SSI Participation by Education
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Figure 4: Life-Cycle Employment Rate by Education
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Figure 5: Real Average State Benefits and Earnings, 1979-2001
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Figure 6: Life-Cycle Real Wages by Education
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Figure 7: Cross-State Standard Deviation of AFDC/TANF and SSI
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Table 1:  Number of Observations by Year in Each 5-Year Birth Cohort from 1919–1983 
 
Year 1979-
1983 
1974-
1978 
1969-
1973 
1964-
1968 
1959-
1963 
1954-
1958 
1949-
1953 
1944-
1948 
1939-
1943 
1934-
1938 
1929-
1933 
1924-
1928 
1919-
1923 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
39 
101 
254 
372 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
50 
100 
144 
237 
268 
369 
405 
747 
755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
43 
112 
157 
232 
329 
403 
472 
471 
456 
497 
512 
518 
1000 
1072 
 
 
 
15 
34 
77 
143 
242 
302 
360 
452 
539 
555 
624 
657 
698 
565 
565 
610 
628 
614 
1097 
1163 
104 
165 
237 
304 
375 
464 
513 
615 
632 
624 
684 
742 
847 
847 
853 
880 
738 
770 
758 
729 
706 
1209 
1236 
509 
578 
620 
644 
685 
736 
776 
759 
769 
764 
875 
859 
874 
827 
882 
841 
741 
719 
592 
623 
576 
988 
935 
765 
787 
698 
713 
725 
848 
817 
872 
850 
718 
774 
782 
741 
722 
595 
543 
508 
437 
374 
286 
240 
414 
391 
801 
841 
794 
805 
740 
726 
698 
655 
619 
499 
478 
435 
402 
369 
    312 
252 
171 
156 
122 
116 
89 
139 
140 
669 
664 
618 
529 
525 
501 
410 
372 
320 
248 
227 
192 
153 
139 
104 
79 
59 
50 
62 
51 
27 
37 
20 
449 
476 
353 
313 
298 
234 
186 
172 
111 
72 
99 
75 
54 
47 
27 
18 
14 
12 
8 
1 
304 
265 
244 
194 
137 
113 
78 
72 
58 
45 
37 
28 
13 
3 
 
199 
174 
112 
75 
69 
45 
32 
21 
12 
6 
48 
38 
21 
15 
11 
Note:  Data are from the 1980-2002 March Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey.  The unit of analysis is the family, and to be included in 
the sample the head is required to be a single woman between the ages of 18 and 60, not self-employed, not a farmer, and to have children under the age of 18 
present.  The total number of observations is 88,802 single female-headed families. 
 
 
Table 2:  Selected Weighted Summary Statistics 
 
Single Female-Headed Families 
 Total  Education < 12 Education = 12 Education > 12 
 
AFDC Income Share 
 
SSI Income Share 
 
Wage Income Share 
 
AFDC Participation Rate 
 
SSI Participation Rate 
 
Employment Rate 
 
Gross 3-Person AFDC Monthly 
Benefit 
Gross SSI Monthly Benefit 
 
Gross Hourly Wage 
 
Income, tM?  ($1000) 
 
Other Income, Nt ($1000) 
 
Race (=1 if white) 
 
Number of Children < 18 years old 
 
Fraction  No AFDC Income 
 
Fraction  All AFDC Income 
 
Fraction  No SSI Income 
 
Fraction All SSI Income 
 
Fraction No Wage Income 
 
Fraction All Wage Income 
 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate 
 
Effective AFDC Tax on Earnings 
 
Effective AFDC Tax on Nonlabor 
 
 
0.246 
(0.403) 
0.031 
(0.149) 
0.723 
(0.423) 
0.329 
(0.470) 
0.052 
(0.222) 
0.784 
(0.412) 
512.727 
(216.734) 
588.850 
(95.131) 
9.317 
(10.551) 
18.450 
(17.543) 
7.201 
(10.535) 
0.630 
(0.483) 
1.833 
(1.006) 
0.671 
(0.470) 
0.183 
(0.387) 
0.948 
(0.222) 
0.012 
(0.110) 
0.216 
(0.412) 
0.646 
(0.478) 
3.875 
(23.034) 
–0.321 
(0.132) 
–0.245 
(0.163) 
  
0.495 
(0.462) 
0.058 
(0.203) 
0.447 
(0.467) 
0.607 
(0.488) 
0.091 
(0.287) 
0.535 
(0.499) 
529.579 
(224.415) 
593.476 
(98.278) 
4.406 
(7.802) 
10.262 
(8.334) 
6.407 
(8.727) 
0.578 
(0.494) 
2.200 
(1.220) 
0.393 
(0.488) 
0.395 
(0.489) 
0.909 
(0.287) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
0.465 
(0.499) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
–8.885 
(20.259) 
–0.323 
(0.132) 
–0.258 
(0.166) 
 
0.222 
(0.386) 
0.027 
(0.140) 
0.752 
(0.405) 
0.309 
(0.462) 
0.046 
(0.209) 
0.815 
(0.388) 
511.534 
(216.298) 
585.255 
(93.047) 
8.626 
(9.258) 
16.704 
(14.256) 
6.574 
(8.878) 
0.623 
(0.485) 
1.787 
(0.952) 
0.691 
(0.462) 
0.158 
(0.365) 
0.954 
(0.209) 
0.010 
(0.101) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
0.667 
(0.471) 
4.402 
(22.664) 
–0.327 
(0.132) 
–0.251 
(0.168) 
 
0.105 
(0.282) 
0.017 
(0.120) 
0.879 
(0.303) 
0.162 
(0.369) 
0.032 
(0.177) 
0.917 
(0.276) 
502.633 
(211.167) 
589.837 
(95.167) 
13.454 
(11.876) 
26.030 
(21.990) 
8.463 
(13.007) 
0.674 
(0.469) 
1.636 
(0.823) 
0.838 
(0.369) 
0.068 
(0.252) 
0.968 
(0.177) 
0.007 
(0.082) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
0.818 
(0.386) 
11.953 
(21.340) 
–0.314 
(0.133) 
–0.229 
(0.154) 
Note:  All income and price data are deflated by the CPI with 2001 base year.  Real income is the sum of income 
from earnings, AFDC, and SSI. Observations in birth-education cohorts with fewer than 50 observations are 
dropped.  In addition, there are 4,421 female heads who do not have income from either earnings, AFDC, or SSI.  
The total number of observations in estimation is 80,495.  The summary statistics are weighted by the family weight 
provided in the CPS. 
 
Table 3:  Distribution of Marginal Tax Rates and Gross and Net Prices in Peak Business Cycle Years 
 1979 1989 1999 
25th Percentile Federal MTR 
50th Percentile Federal MTR 
75th Percentile Federal MTR 
 
25th Percentile State MTR 
50th Percentile State MTR 
75th Percentile State MTR 
 
25th Percentile FICA MTR 
50th Percentile FICA MTR 
75th Percentile FICA MTR 
 
25th Percentile AFDC Effective Earnings MTR 
50th Percentile AFDC Effective Earnings MTR  
75th Percentile AFDC Effective Earnings MTR  
 
25th Percentile AFDC Effective Nonlabor MTR 
50th Percentile AFDC Effective Nonlabor MTR  
75th Percentile AFDC Effective Nonlabor MTR  
 
25th Percentile SSI Effective Earnings MTR 
50th Percentile SSI Effective Earnings MTR  
75th Percentile SSI Effective Earnings MTR  
 
25th Percentile SSI Effective Nonlabor MTR 
50th Percentile SSI Effective Nonlabor MTR  
75th Percentile SSI Effective Nonlabor MTR  
 
25th Percentile Gross Hourly Wage 
50th Percentile Gross Hourly Wage 
75th Percentile Gross Hourly Wage 
 
25th Percentile Net Hourly Wage 
50th Percentile Net Hourly Wage 
75th Percentile Net Hourly Wage 
 
25th Percentile Gross Monthly AFDC Benefit 
50th Percentile Gross Monthly AFDC Benefit 
75th Percentile Gross Monthly AFDC Benefit 
 
25th Percentile Net Monthly AFDC Benefit 
50th Percentile Net Monthly AFDC Benefit 
75th Percentile Net Monthly AFDC Benefit 
 
25th Percentile Gross Monthly SSI Benefit 
50th Percentile Gross Monthly SSI Benefit 
75th Percentile Gross Monthly SSI Benefit 
 
25th Percentile Net Monthly SSI Benefit 
50th Percentile Net Monthly SSI Benefit 
75th Percentile Net Monthly SSI Benefit 
–0.100 
0.040 
0.240 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.030 
 
0.061 
0.061 
0.061 
 
0.260 
0.300 
0.370 
 
0.227 
0.368 
0.546 
 
0.144 
0.180 
0.209 
 
0.639 
0.702 
0.731 
 
2.440 
8.266 
12.488 
 
1.462 
5.791 
8.885 
 
475.726 
683.093 
839.229 
 
0.000 
171.993 
563.238 
 
507.441 
544.035 
661.137 
 
0.000 
217.775 
507.441 
–0.140 
0.010 
0.250 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.040 
 
0.075 
0.075 
0.075 
 
0.246 
0.406 
0.496 
 
0.115 
0.184 
0.362 
 
0.144 
0.180 
0.198 
 
0.639 
0.705 
0.731 
 
2.018 
8.028 
12.939 
 
1.050 
5.708 
8.918 
 
357.041 
488.432 
696.944 
 
0.000 
54.287 
409.883 
 
525.564 
539.846 
629.820 
 
0.000 
252.243 
509.074 
–0.340 
0.150 
0.310 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.044 
 
0.077 
0.077 
0.077 
 
0.180 
0.278 
0.367 
 
0.101 
0.143 
0.233 
 
0.144 
0.180 
0.204 
 
0.639 
0.702 
0.731 
 
5.982 
9.199 
13.953 
 
4.593 
6.273 
10.089 
 
295.525 
386.946 
524.078 
 
0.000 
7.667 
276.566 
 
531.519 
531.519 
599.554 
 
0.000 
153.039 
389.197 
See notes to Tables 1 and 2 for sample description, and text for variable descriptions.  Gross and net wages include 
non-workers, and net AFDC and SSI benefits are set to zero for those with calculated benefits less than zero.  
 
 
Table 4:  Instrumental Variable Tobit Estimates of Income Share Models, After-Tax Prices 
 No State Fixed Effects  State Fixed Effects 
 AFDC  
Share 
SSI 
 Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI 
 Share 
Earnings 
Share 
Log AFDC Benefit 
 
 
Log SSI Benefit 
 
 
Log Wage 
 
 
Log WWD Income 
 
 
Log Virtual Other 
Income 
 
Race (=1 if White) 
 
 
Number of Children 
Under 18 Years old 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
Welfare Waiver (=1 
when implemented) 
 
1st Stage Wage 
Residual 
 
1st Stage Income 
Residual 
 
1st Stage Other 
Income Residual  
 
1st Stage AFDC 
Residual 
 
1st Stage SSI 
Residual 
0.115 
(0.011) 
 
–0.140 
(0.003) 
 
–0.185 
(0.037) 
 
–0.036 
(0.013) 
 
–0.092 
(0.026) 
 
–0.050 
(0.007) 
 
0.042 
(0.005) 
 
0.009 
(0.002) 
 
–0.026 
(0.014) 
 
–0.240 
(0.037) 
 
0.022 
(0.013) 
 
0.111 
(0.026) 
 
0.106 
(0.011) 
 
–0.004 
(0.003) 
–0.106 
(0.022) 
 
0.215 
(0.007) 
 
–0.211 
(0.095) 
 
–0.040 
(0.032) 
 
–0.025 
(0.068) 
 
–0.054 
(0.017) 
 
0.031 
(0.013) 
 
0.013 
(0.005) 
 
–0.016 
(0.032) 
 
–0.226 
(0.095) 
 
–0.010 
(0.031) 
 
0.115 
(0.068) 
 
–0.003 
(0.022) 
 
0.082 
(0.007) 
–0.132 
(0.012) 
 
–0.105 
(0.004) 
 
0.306 
(0.043) 
 
0.086 
(0.015) 
 
0.157 
(0.030) 
 
0.058 
(0.008) 
 
–0.049 
(0.006) 
 
–0.013 
(0.002) 
 
0.045 
(0.016) 
 
0.213 
(0.043) 
 
–0.036 
(0.015) 
 
–0.180 
(0.030) 
 
–0.082 
(0.012) 
 
–0.010 
(0.003) 
 0.120 
(0.011) 
 
–0.141 
(0.003) 
 
–0.194 
(0.037) 
 
–0.029 
(0.013) 
 
–0.095 
(0.026) 
 
–0.034 
(0.007) 
 
0.038 
(0.005) 
 
0.006 
(0.003) 
 
0.003 
(0.015) 
 
–0.230 
(0.037) 
 
0.024 
(0.013) 
 
0.116 
(0.026) 
 
0.104 
(0.011) 
 
–0.004 
(0.002) 
–0.104 
(0.022) 
 
0.216 
(0.007) 
 
–0.217 
(0.095) 
 
–0.044 
(0.032) 
 
–0.022 
(0.067) 
 
–0.054 
(0.018) 
 
0.031 
(0.013) 
 
–0.003 
(0.007) 
 
–0.013 
(0.035) 
 
–0.217 
(0.095) 
 
–0.005 
(0.031) 
 
0.112 
(0.068) 
 
–0.004 
(0.022) 
 
0.081 
(0.007) 
–0.135 
(0.012) 
 
–0.105 
(0.004) 
 
0.315 
(0.043) 
 
0.086 
(0.015) 
 
0.161 
(0.030) 
 
0.047 
(0.008) 
 
–0.047 
(0.006) 
 
–0.006 
(0.003) 
 
0.023 
(0.017) 
 
0.201 
(0.043) 
 
–0.039 
(0.015) 
 
–0.186 
(0.030) 
 
–0.080 
(0.012) 
 
–0.010 
(0.003) 
        
2χ  test of 
symmetry [p-value] 
 186.323 
[0.000] 
   217.115 
[0.000] 
 
Note:  Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  All specifications control for birth-year by education cohort 
effects and year effects.  See notes to Tables 1 and 2 for sample description. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Extensive and Intensive Margin Price Elasticities  
 No State Fixed Effects  State Fixed Effects 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 
AFDC Benefit— 
Ever Participate 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Dependence 
 
SSI Benefit— Ever 
Participate 
 
SSI Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
SSI Benefit—
Dependence 
 
Hourly Wage— 
Ever Participate 
 
Hourly Wage—
Unconditional Mean 
 
Hourly Wage—
Dependence 
 
 
0.599 
(0.481) 
 
0.667 
(0.065) 
 
1.011 
(0.003) 
 
–0.727 
(0.129) 
 
–0.809 
(0.021) 
 
–1.227 
(0.001) 
 
–0.960 
(1.603) 
 
–1.069 
(0.216) 
 
–1.621 
(0.009) 
 
–0.589 
(0.810) 
 
–0.648 
(0.147) 
 
–0.902 
(0.002) 
 
1.196 
(0.341) 
 
1.316 
(0.117) 
 
1.832 
(0.001) 
 
–1.169 
(3.459) 
 
–1.286 
(0.589) 
 
–1.790 
(0.008) 
 
–0.130 
(0.058) 
 
–0.170 
(0.016) 
 
–0.326 
(0.003) 
 
–0.104 
(0.017) 
 
–0.136 
(0.005) 
 
–0.260 
(0.001) 
 
0.302 
(0.207) 
 
0.396 
(0.056) 
 
0.759 
(0.009) 
  
0.633 
(0.503) 
 
0.713 
(0.066) 
 
1.049 
(0.003) 
 
–0.743 
(0.136) 
 
–0.838 
(0.022) 
 
–1.232 
(0.001) 
 
–1.020 
(1.680) 
 
–1.149 
(0.221) 
 
–1.690 
(0.009) 
 
–0.587 
(0.817) 
 
–0.637 
(0.146) 
 
–0.894 
(0.002) 
 
1.215 
(0.342) 
 
1.320 
(0.117) 
 
1.852 
(0.001) 
 
–1.223 
(3.492) 
 
–1.328 
(0.590) 
 
–1.864 
(0.007) 
 
–0.134 
(0.059) 
 
–0.176 
(0.016) 
 
–0.336 
(0.003) 
 
–0.105 
(0.018) 
 
–0.137 
(0.005) 
 
–0.262 
(0.001) 
 
0.314 
(0.211) 
 
0.411 
(0.056) 
 
0.787 
(0.009) 
Note:  Elasticities are evaluated at the means of the nonlinear functions.  Standard errors calculated via the ‘delta 
method’ are in parentheses.   
 
 
 
Table 6:  Morishima Elasticities of Substitution 
 No State Fixed Effects  State Fixed Effects 
 AFDC 
 Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 
AFDC Benefit 
 
SSI Benefit 
 
Hourly Wage 
 
 
 
 
–1.306 
 
–0.917 
 
–2.126 
 
 
 
–1.462 
 
 
–1.235 
 
–1.426 
 
 
  
 
 
–1.326 
 
–0.960 
 
 
–2.160 
 
 
 
–1.468 
 
 
–1.356 
 
–1.464 
 
 
 
Note:  Elasticities are evaluated at the means of the nonlinear functions.   
 
Table 7:  Sensitivity of Extensive and Intensive Margin Elasticities To Alternative Specifications 
    
After-Tax Prices with State Fixed Effects 
 Pre-Welfare Reform (1979-1996)  Tobit First Stage 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Ever Participate 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Always Participate 
 
SSI Benefit—Ever 
Participate 
 
SSI Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
SSI Benefit—
Always Participate 
 
Hourly Wage—Ever 
Participate 
 
Hourly Wage—
Unconditional Mean 
 
Hourly Wage—
Always Participate 
 
 
0.514 
( 0.549) 
 
0.580 
(0.075) 
 
0.868 
(0.004) 
 
–0.712 
(0.117) 
 
–0.803 
(0.020) 
 
–1.202 
(0.001) 
 
–1.012 
(1.678) 
 
–1.142 
(0.230) 
 
–1.709 
(0.011) 
 
–0.868 
(1.245) 
 
–0.940 
(0.213) 
 
–1.332 
(0.002) 
 
1.405 
(0.401) 
 
1.521 
(0.152) 
 
2.155 
(0.001) 
 
–1.501 
(4.738) 
 
–1.626 
(0.742) 
 
–2.302 
(0.007) 
 
–0.126 
(0.091) 
 
–0.163 
(0.024) 
 
–0.314 
(0.003) 
 
–0.107 
(0.022) 
 
–0.138 
(0.006) 
 
–0.266 
(0.001) 
 
0.380 
(0.295) 
 
0.491 
(0.076) 
 
0.945 
(0.010) 
  
1.186 
(0.178) 
 
1.330 
(0.035) 
 
1.979 
(0.001) 
 
–0.890 
(1.113) 
 
–0.998 
(0.147) 
 
–1.485 
(0.006) 
 
–2.479 
(1.014) 
 
–2.779 
(0.141) 
 
–4.139 
(0.005) 
 
–0.601 
(0.238) 
 
–0.639 
(0.066) 
 
–0.924 
(0.001) 
 
1.115 
(1.873) 
 
1.185 
(0.330) 
 
1.716 
(0.004) 
 
–2.764 
(1.733) 
 
–2.938 
(0.389) 
 
–4.253 
(0.004) 
 
–0.216 
(0.021) 
 
–0.283 
(0.005) 
 
–0.541 
(0.001) 
 
–0.086 
(0.140) 
 
–0.112 
(0.037) 
 
–0.215 
(0.006) 
 
0.623 
(0.123) 
 
0.815 
(0.033) 
 
1.558 
(0.005) 
Note:  Elasticities are evaluated at the means of the nonlinear functions.  Standard errors calculated via the ‘delta 
method’ are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 7 Continued 
    
Before-Tax Prices with State Fixed Effects 
 AFDC 
Share 
SSI  
Share 
Earnings 
Share 
    
 
AFDC Benefit—
Ever Participate 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
AFDC Benefit—
Always Participate 
 
SSI Benefit—Ever 
Participate 
 
SSI Benefit—
Unconditional Mean 
 
SSI Benefit—
Always Participate 
 
Hourly Wage—Ever 
Participate 
 
Hourly Wage—
Unconditional Mean 
 
Hourly Wage—
Always Participate 
 
 
0.456 
(0.252) 
 
0.537 
(0.097) 
 
0.725 
(0.024) 
 
–0.603 
(0.613) 
 
–0.710 
(0.234) 
 
–0.958 
(0.059) 
 
–1.395 
(0.364) 
 
–1.641 
(0.143) 
 
–2.215 
(0.035) 
 
–0.460 
(0.504) 
 
–0.509 
(0.229) 
 
–0.592 
(0.072) 
 
–1.047 
(1.385) 
 
–1.157 
(0.631) 
 
–1.347 
(0.198) 
 
–1.338 
(0.824) 
 
–1.479 
(0.372) 
 
–1.723 
(0.114) 
 
–0.084 
(0.066) 
 
–0.112 
(0.033) 
 
–0.170 
(0.016) 
 
0.100 
(0.160) 
 
0.133 
(0.080) 
 
0.203 
(0.039) 
 
0.611 
(0.097) 
 
0.814 
(0.048) 
 
1.239 
(0.023) 
    
Note:  Elasticities are evaluated at the means of the nonlinear functions.  Standard errors calculated via the ‘delta 
method’ are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8:  Distribution of Simulated Responses to Various Policy Reforms Across Peak Business Cycle Years 
(Percent) 
 1979 1989 1999 
 
AFDC Benefit Fixed at Real 1979 Level 
 
25th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
50th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
75th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
50th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
75th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
50th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
75th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
 
Percent with Welfare Gain 
 
“Family Cap” AFDC Benefit for 3 Persons 
 
25th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
50th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
75th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
50th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
75th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
50th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
75th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
 
Percent with Welfare Gain 
 
Uniform Federal AFDC Benefit 
 
25th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
50th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
75th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
50th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
75th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
50th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
75th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
 
Percent with Welfare Gain 
 
 
 
 
–0.590% 
0.758 
2.848 
 
–1.777 
–0.591 
0.542 
 
–0.629 
–0.205 
0.287 
 
36.3 
 
 
 
0.939 
9.508 
27.831 
 
–13.794 
–6.799 
–0.896 
 
–5.599 
–2.632 
–0.199 
 
24.1 
 
 
 
–16.137 
–0.784 
8.117 
 
–7.612 
0.790 
9.801 
 
–3.759 
0.445 
2.973 
 
52.3 
 
 
 
12.570% 
27.633 
46.417 
 
–22.692 
–17.112 
–12.489 
 
–13.765 
–6.689 
–4.029 
 
5.1 
 
 
 
1.884 
8.529 
23.990 
 
–13.301 
–7.089 
–1.852 
 
–4.402 
–1.840 
–0.257 
 
22.4 
 
 
 
11.866 
26.505 
54.263 
 
–26.243 
–17.499 
–11.124 
 
–14.153 
–7.421 
–3.925 
 
4.9 
 
 
 
68.372% 
120.399 
180.247 
 
–41.211 
–34.409 
–27.542 
 
–17.124 
–11.135 
–7.171 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
0.152 
14.247 
26.500 
 
–12.908 
–7.550 
–0.071 
 
–3.381 
–1.353 
–0.025 
 
24.1 
 
 
 
62.420 
121.806 
176.719 
 
–40.416 
–35.089 
–26.892 
 
–18.345 
–11.727 
–7.099 
 
0.0 
 
 
Table 8 Continued   
 1979 1989 1999 
 
1979 Net Wage Structure 
 
25th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
50th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
75th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
50th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
75th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
50th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
75th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
 
Percent with Welfare Gain 
 
Elimination of Income Taxes 
 
25th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
50th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
75th Percentile of AFDC Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
50th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
75th Percentile of SSI Share Response 
 
25th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
50th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
75th Percentile of Earnings Share Response 
 
Percent with Welfare Gain 
 
 
 
 
–3.561% 
–0.995 
1.177 
 
–3.348 
–1.156 
1.226 
 
–0.571 
0.447 
1.581 
 
63.2 
 
 
 
–41.664 
–29.953 
–13.425 
 
–32.615 
–25.442 
–16.625 
 
7.823 
11.265 
20.627 
 
90.2 
 
 
 
–0.153% 
9.576 
23.031 
 
–1.242 
9.854 
25.439 
 
–7.043 
–3.056 
0.032 
 
47.7 
 
 
 
–37.674 
–27.094 
–12.232 
 
–34.195 
–26.229 
–16.398 
 
5.079 
8.892 
16.102 
 
83.0 
 
 
 
16.753% 
41.885 
88.673 
 
12.729 
28.243 
56.014 
 
–11.402 
–7.129 
–3.190 
 
26.4 
 
 
 
–48.115 
–38.665 
–22.347 
 
–35.342 
–28.037 
–16.331 
 
4.504 
7.171 
10.178 
 
88.8 
 
